LGBT+ people of Ukraine during the full-scale war

The general situation and dynamics of changes

General Context

On 24 February 2022, the Russian Federation
started the full-scale military invasion of Ukraine. Warnings emerged from
various sources during 2021 that this could happen. At the same time, the
Ukrainian state authorities, while making limited preparations for a possible
war, publicly denied its possibility until the last moment. This largely
contributed to the fact that its onset was unexpected and somewhat shocking for
many, forcing them to make decisions, essential for their future life and, in
some cases, survival as such, as quickly as possible.

The dynamics of the first weeks of the great war, when the Russian army was advancing in the South and East and at the same time receiving a strong repulse in the North, was very fast. Also, various experts and analysts mostly expressed opinions that the war would not last long. This contributed to the fact that all that happened and decisions made in this context were considered by the majority as temporary, without long-term planning – whether they were decisions to evacuate, stay where they are, or join the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Such dynamics persisted throughout most of 2022 to one degree or another.

On the contrary, in 2023, when the frontline moved very little and the war had become rather a kind of positional, it was realized by the most that such a situation could last indefinitely. This, accordingly, encouraged switching to long-term planning, based on the circumstances in which people found themselves by that time, whether was it their conscious choice or not.

The war became a catalyst for political processes in Ukraine that started earlier, but have now accelerated: distancing from Russia and, at the same time, moving towards Western countries. In addition to purely practical considerations, related to the fact that Ukraine simply could not survive without foreign aid in the current circumstances, values also play a role. The war is seen as the defense of a civilizational choice in favor of the progressive, legal, democratic values of the conventionally Western world instead of the archaic, authoritarian values of the conventionally Eastern world, embodied primarily by the aggressive Russian Federation.

In this process, in particular, Ukraine’s movement towards the European Union accelerated, with obtaining the status of a candidate country on 23 June 2022 first, then on 14 December 2023 – permission to start negotiations, actually, on joining the EU. Similarly, albeit slowly, there is a movement to join the NATO military bloc. This is also reflected in public attitudes, where support for respective movements has significantly increased compared to the period before the full-scale war. In turn, all this expanded the window of opportunity for changes related to LGBT+ people – both at the social and state level, at the legislative level in particular, where Western countries also became a reference point.

Russia, for its part, also considers the war against Ukraine a part of civilizational confrontation with the West, and the further it goes, the more it allows itself to spit openly upon Western institutions and legal standards. Considering the acceptance of LGBT+ people and the protection of their rights as part of the Western worldview, the Russian Federation continued the policy of labeling everything that goes beyond cisheterosexuality as a hostile ideology that must be opposed. This is what the Russian state is doing, in particular, by adopting even more oppressive legislation on LGBT+ people. This also has consequences for the occupied territories of Ukraine, which Russia, by imitating referendums, declared as its own and is trying to extend its laws to them. On the other hand, it has consequences for the rest of Ukraine that aggressive homophobia and transphobia are increasingly associated with Russia.

The above does not mean that conservative forces in Ukraine have come to nothing. Quite contrary, considering the situation as an existential threat to themselves, they moved even into deeper opposition, building their position on a supposed connection between patriotism and “traditional values”, while focusing their efforts primarily on opposing political initiatives aimed at greater equality for LGBT+ people.

The analysis of the dynamics of changes in 2023 by specific areas

At the end of 2022, I prepared an analytical note, in which the situation of LGBT+ people in Ukraine at that time was considered. Based on the analyzed information, it contained proposals in the final part for improving the protection and enforcement of the rights of LGBT+ people during and after the war. While such proposals are not binding on government agencies – not even with obligations to report on their progress – they remain a useful tool to evaluate progress in this area or lack thereof. So, let’s look at the general situation in the areas covered by the proposals and what changes have taken place in this regard over the past year.

This approach leaves some areas not covered. This is primarily because proposals for improvement are addressed to the state, while the state’s influence on the situation is much limited in some areas. They include, in particular, territories outside of its contro – the Russian-occupied parts of Ukraine, as well as other countries where LGBT+ Ukrainians were evacuated. Therefore, separate chapters should also be dedicated to the situation there and its dynamics. In addition, the situation of LGBT+ people is influenced by society’s attitudes towards them, so let’s look at how it has been changing during the great war by the end of the text.

State recognition of same-sex relations

Proposal

Introduce legislative changes that would give same-sex couples the right to register unions through marriage or a partnership equivalent to marriage in terms of the rights it confers. Also, recognize same-sex marriages registered abroad.

GENERAL SITUATION

At the time of the beginning of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, there was no legislation in Ukraine to regulate relationships other than heterosexual ones. The need to introduce such legislation was already indicated in the governmental Action Plan for the Implementation of the National Human Rights Strategy 2015–2020, however, given the position of a significant number of religious associations, consolidated by the Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organizations (UCCRO), this item of the plan was marked
as unfeasible.

The Great War actualized the problem of the lack of marriage equality on the grounds of sexual orientation. After all, many situations arise where at least one person in a couple serves in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. If their relationship is not legalized, then, for example, in the case of one person being injured, the other one may not have the right to visit them in the hospital and intensive care unit, to make decisions related to life support, as well as, in the case of death, to decide on burial and to claim the inheritance of the first line. Inequality only deepened when, on 7 March 2022, the Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers allowed to marry remotely – but again, only for persons of different sexes.

On 3 June 2022, an electronic petition to the President of Ukraine was initiated, requesting the legalization of same-sex marriages. It is worth mentioning that since 2015, when the petition website was launched, this is not the first petition with that kind of request, but the first one that gathered the necessary 25,000 votes for consideration – and in less than half of the allotted time of 90 days. President Zelenskyy’s answer was ambiguous, on the one hand, containing a reference to the impossibility of changing the Constitution during martial law – and, therefore, of changing the definition of marriage as “based on the free consent of a woman and a man”. On the other hand, he mentioned that the government was already working on a solution for registered civil partnerships, and thus forwarded the issue to the prime minister. Anyway, this response became rather a symbolic victory at that time, since it did not lead to direct actions on the part of the government.

2023

On 13 March 2023, the member of parliament from the Holos (“Voice”) party Inna Sovsun submitted to the Verkhovna Rada draft law No. 9103 “On the Institute of Registered Partnerships”. It contains a detailed regulation of such partnerships that should be available equally to same-sex and different-sex couples and be equated to a family, with restrictions compared to marriages only in a few aspects, mostly related to the adoption of children. It is also supposed to recognize as partnerships same-sex marriages and partnerships between persons of any gender concluded abroad.

During 2023, this draft law was already supported by several committees of the Verkhovna Rada. Significantly, political rhetoric there included, in particular, that it should be supported exactly as a movement in the opposite direction “from Russian screpas”. It is also worth noting that the Ministry of Defense initially spoke out against the draft law, but later – after Rustem Umerov became the minister, renewing a major part of the team as well – changed its position to a supportive one. In addition, the Ministry of Justice, which previously planned to bring forward an alternative draft law – more restrictive compared to Sovsun’s proposal, according to some sources – changed its plans, stating that it is ready to support this one with some amendments in case of a positive vote in the first reading. At the same time, the Committee on Legal Policy, which is the key one for this draft law, has not considered it yet, delaying the moment of its consideration in the session hall of the Verkhovna Rada as well.

In the same context, it is worth mentioning that on 1 June 2023, the European Court of Human Rights issued a decision in the case of Maymulakhin and Markiv – a gay couple that actually lives as a family, but cannot legalize their relationship in Ukraine. The court recognized that the lack of regulation of such relations violates the right to respect for private and family life and constitutes discrimination. Accordingly, this decision became an additional argument in favor of the adoption of the draft law on civil partnerships.

It can be added that nowadays almost all countries of the European Union already have either marriage equality or some form of partnership, or at least they are on the way to introduce such a form soon. Thus, the movement of Ukraine to join the EU is another factor that makes the sooner adoption of draft law No. 9103 or similar a more realistic prospect. At the same time, a positive vote for it is not yet guaranteed, so it is worth intensifying work with MPs – primarily those who have not yet decided on a position – to enlist their support.

The procedure of the transition

Consider the possibilities of simplifying the procedure of transition. Remove requirements from it, because of which obtaining legal gender recognition may take too long.

For now, the procedure of the transition approved in 2016 remains in force in Ukraine. Its medical part is regulated by the Unified Clinical Protocol “Gender Dysphoria” of the Ministry of Health and provides for psychiatric observation to set a diagnosis of “Transsexualism” or another according to the International Classification of Diseases Revision 10 (ICD-10), as well as medical interventions with hormone replacement therapy as mandatory among them. A “Medical certificate on the change (correction) of sex” is issued in the result, which, according to Article 51 of the “Basics of the Legislation of Ukraine on Health Care”, is the ground for legal gender recognition, i.e. the change of identity documents.

This approach makes the legal procedure dependent on the medical one, in particular on the psychiatric diagnosis, which can take two years or even more to obtain according to the formal requirements of the protocol. In practice, psychiatrists often replace these two years with two weeks of observation in a psychiatric hospital, where a place is usually not free of charge. In general, the text of the mentioned clinical protocol contains errors, incorrect wording, and direct and indirect contradictions, which was the reason for attempts to update it almost from the very entry into force. They, however, were not successful due to a change in the position of the Ministry of Health, and subsequently in its lead team and priorities.

Now it seems more expedient to update the transition procedure in conjunction with the implementation of ICD-11, which entered into force on 1 January 2022 at the international level. In ICD-11, transgender diagnoses have the general name “Gender Incongruence” and no longer belong to the psychiatric category, allowing to revise the procedure for setting them in the direction of less pathologizing and, accordingly, liberalize the requirements for providing medical interventions and issuing a final medical certificate.

According to data from the trans program of the Insight organization, the number of requests from transgender people for counseling about transition dropped to a minimum at the beginning of the full-scale invasion. However, it was restored within a few months, and in 2023, according to information from the legal service of Insight, requests related to legal gender recognition were among the most popular, with a two times increase in the overall number of requests. Therefore, the need to improve the transition procedure not only does not lose its relevance during the war but also grows.

In Ukraine, the process of implementing ICD-11 began in 2021 with the translation of its text into Ukrainian. It slowed down in the first year of the great war but resumed in 2023, and the draft translation was completed. It is expected that the Ministry of Health will issue an order soon to move it to the next stage, during which, in particular, there will be:

• defined structures and persons responsible for the implementation process;
• determined the terms of the stages of implementation, including the date of entry into force of the ICD-11 in Ukraine;
• created expert groups on separate fields, which representatives of public organizations will be able join to;
• finalized the translation of all parts by groups according to their fields;
• developed a transcoding system between ICD-10 and ICD-11, which will be used at the transitional stage;
• implemented the necessary organizational measures so that health care professionals could start using ICD-11 in their work.

According to this plan, it makes sense for public activists working on trans issues to join the expert group responsible for the section “Conditions related to sexual health” which includes the diagnosis of “Gender incongruence” to oversee its implementation. In particular, in my opinion, it is at the stage of the work of such a group the issue of developing a new clinical protocol based on ICD-11, which will determine a less pathologized and more quick and transparent procedure of transition, is worth raising.

Counteraction to the discrimination, hate crimes, and hate speech on the grounds of SOGI

●      Adopt changes in the legislation necessary to establish administrative and criminal liability for hate crimes on the grounds of SOGI.

●      Add SOGI to the general anti-discrimination legislation.

These two proposals are considered together since both the situation and the dynamics of its change in the areas related to them are similar and joint to some extent. To date, both the general anti-discrimination legislation and the legislation on combating hate crimes in Ukraine do not contain SOGI grounds explicitly. At the same time, both include generalized “other grounds” that theoretically embrace SOGI but are usually ignored in practice. Homophobic and transphobic crimes are often treated as hooliganism if investigated by the police at all. As for discrimination, there are no effective legislative means against it in a broad sense, although there are exceptions in certain areas:

• Article 2¹ of the Code of the Labor Laws prohibits discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity among other things since 2015. At the same time, the labor sphere is one of the most difficult in terms of proving the facts of discrimination and prosecution for them. Also, LGBT+ people themselves often avoid reporting such cases to law enforcement agencies, fearing their SOGI to be outed.
• In 2022, amendments were made to the “Law on Advertising”, which prohibits to include sexual orientation among the requirements in job advertisements (unfortunately, there is no gender identityin the list).
• Also in 2022, the “Law on Media” was adopted, which prohibits the dissemination of statements that incitediscrimination or oppression against individuals and groups of individualsbased on SOGI inter alia.

Both of the proposals above were included in the Action Plan for the implementation of the National Human Rights Strategy as early as 2015 but were regularly postponed and delayed. Only in 2021, draft law No. 5488 was submitted to the Verkhovna Rada, combining them: it should strengthen liability for hate crimes and hate speech, clearly criminalizing them on the grounds of SOGI, as well as discrimination on these grounds. However, the MPs were in no hurry to consider this draft law too.

Relevant to these points is also the Istanbul Convention – the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence, which was ratified in Ukraine on 20 June 2022. Although it is focused specifically on violence against women, it requires the prohibition of discrimination against women on the grounds of SOGI among others, and some of the types of violence it criminalizes are particularly common against LGBT+ people. Also, since the Istanbul Convention defines violence as gender-based, it extends its provisions to transwomen. The process of ratification of the convention had a long history when it was hindered for religious reasons – mainly by the already mentioned UCCRO. And only when certain countries emphasized the importance of ratification for them to support Ukraine’s acquisition of the status of an EU candidate country, the parliament had quickly voted for it.

In the text on the situation of LGBT+ people in Ukraine for 2022, it was noted that the level of organized homophobia and related crimes has significantly decreased since the beginning of the great war. This trend continues for now, while the opposition to LGBT+ has ceased to be one of the priorities in the activities of radical right-wing organizations. At the same time, according to the legal service of the Insight organization, the number of requests by LGBT+ people related to cases of violence remains at the same level. These are, in particular, various cases of domestic violence, as well as abuse by staff of territorial centers of recruitment. The LGBT Human Rights Center “Nash Svit” also recorded a number of crimes on the grounds of homophobia and transphobia, with offenses, threats, humiliation of human dignity, and physical violence of various degrees dominating in the first half of 2023.

Here are some examples of such crimes over the past year:

• In May, a group of six people attacked the artist Daniel Skrypnyk in the Podil district in Kyiv because of his sexual orientation. In November, the Podil Court issued a verdict in this case, noting as anaggravating circumstance the “sex” of the victim, apparently, actually referring to his sexual orientation. This illustrates once more the need for law No. 5488 or similar, where this ground would be included explicitly.

• In August, a man beat transgender soldier Helen Mark with a homophobic motive on the street in thecenter of Lviv. At the beginning of November, the Halytskyi District Court found the attacker guilty under Article 161 ofthe Criminal Code “Violation of the equality of citizens depending on their race, nationality, religious beliefs, disability, and other grounds”, and the court’s decision stated that “the motive for committing the crime was exactly discrimination on the ground of trans status”. On the one hand, it can be called a historical precedent, when”other grounds”, including trans status implicitly, worked nevertheless. On the other hand, it remains an exception, and it is futile to expect it to become the rule without explicitly mentioning SOGI among the grounds to consider crime a hate crime based on them.

• In June, there was an attack on the community center of the regional branch of the Insight organization in Lutsk. The attackers broke down the front door and made a pogrom inside. Soon the attacker was arrested and criminal proceedings were started under the article “theft committed in wartime conditions”, but the police refused to investigate it as a hate crime.

• Also in Lutsk since 2022, an organized group tracked gays and arranged datesfor them, then forced them to slander themselves on camera with pedophilia and blackmailed them with this, or simply with an outing of their sexual orientation. A military man was also among the sufferers. After several victims contacted the police, an investigation began, and the gang was arrested only in 2023. The investigation proceeds under the articles of extortion committed by agroup of persons and robbery committed under martial law.

• In June, during the international LGBTQIA+ film festival “Sunny Bunny”, radical right-wing groups repeatedly threatened to attack and set fire to cinemas where festival films were screened. In the end, the threats were not accomplished, and the festival went off safely. At the same time, no one was brought to accountability for the threats.

Significantly, the majority of such cases occurred during Pride month, when LGBT+ topics are more widely present in the information space and, accordingly, attract more attention to homophobes and transphobes.

Returning to the draft law No. 5488, the Committee on Law Enforcement considered it in May and recommended to adopt as a basis. Subsequently, it was included in the agenda of the session of the Verkhovna Rada, but at the time of writing, it has not been considered yet. According to unofficial information, there is no hurry to bring the draft law to the session hall because there are still not enough MPs ready to vote for it. Therefore, its further fate may depend again on the position of the partner states in the process of Ukraine’s movement towards the EU.

As for the Istanbul Convention, its ratification did not make it all finished, because it is even more important to bring the legislation into line with the provisions of the convention. Such changes to the Ukrainian legislation on combating domestic violence were partially introduced even before the ratification and are currently ongoing. But it should be noted that both the current legislation and the draft law in the course of ratification, adopted in the first reading already in 2023, define such violence based on sex, not gender, as in the text of the convention itself. What may appear as merely a peculiarity of the translation at first glance would potentially have the effect of excluding transwomen who have not obtained legal gender recognition from such legislation.

In addition, at the beginning of August, the head of the National Council of Television and Radio Broadcasting Olha Herasymyuk publicly announced the development of a dictionary of undesirable vocabulary and criteria for information inadmissible for dissemination in the media – in particular, information that incites to hatred and cruelty towards individuals or groups of individuals on the grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity. The development of such criteria is a logical part of the process of implementing the “Law on Media” adopted a year before. In fact, it began in the spring with the involvement of experts from many LGBT+ organizations, as well as the Office of the Ombudsman, and in the autumn, the criteria were presented during a public discussion. Finalization of them, as well as of the mechanisms of their implementation and application, is still ongoing at the time of writing.

Summarizing this section, it can be said that despite some changes, the general situation remains uncertain. So in 2024, it is worth intensifying the pressure for consideration and adoption of the draft law No. 5488 by the Verkhovna Rada.

Going abroad for transgender persons

Revise restrictions on going abroad towards a more differentiated approach. For transwomen who are not legally recognized but have a trans-related medical diagnosis, allow them to leave on the same terms as other women.

The possibility of going abroad under martial law in Ukraine is currently restricted for persons with a male legal gender of age 18 to 60 with some exceptions. This means in general, transwomen who have not obtained legal gender recognition and have a male gender marker are not allowed to leave. At the same time, an exception applies to persons removed from military registration – for example, after they were recognized as unfit for military service.

The Order of the Ministry of Defense No. 402 of 2008 includes trans diagnoses according to the ICD-10 among those that, being “severely expressed, with a tendency to repeated long-term decompensations or pathological reactions,” mean complete unfitness for military service, and if “moderately expressed with unstable compensation or compensated”, then this is unfitness in peacetime and limited fitness in wartime. Since there are no criteria to determine the “degree of compensation”, now in wartime, the decision on fitness or unfitness is made in each individual case by the Military Medical Commission (MMC). Such decisions are due to the subjective considerations of the commission members, and the decisive role may be played not by the trans status as such, but by other individual particularities of the state of health. As a result, sometimes a trans person who does not feel ready to serve in the army may be assessed as fit, and vice versa: one who would like to serve will be removed from the military register as unfit. Such uncertainty also provokes corrupt actions, when members of the MMC could demand a bribe to make a decision desirable for a person. Finally, for trans persons who have not received legal gender recognition, such situations also constitute gender discrimination, as trans women are treated as men and vice versa.

In the first weeks of the full-scale war, when the flow of people wishing to evacuate abroad was the largest, border guards did not always carry out checks carefully and thoroughly. Due to this, some trans people with a male gender marker in their passport managed to leave – however, that does not exempt them from potential liability before the law. It became impossible later, and there are known cases when transwomen resorted to illegal ways of crossing the border, including outside the checkpoints. Certain such stories, having received media coverage post-factum, did, in my opinion, a disservice to the Ukrainian trans community, presenting trans people only as victims fleeing war from transphobic Ukraine. This view has gained popularity, especially in Western media. In fact, among trans people as well as among other social groups, there are people in different circumstances and with different motivations, which determine different choices: from evacuation abroad to joining the ranks of the Armed Forces. It is worth mentioning that there were also cases of the opposite nature when a transwoman who already had legal gender recognition was denied crossing the border after the border guards found out her trans status. And this is not only discrimination but also illegal actions on their part.

From the first days of the full-scale war, LGBT+ organizations have been helping LGBT+ people with evacuation abroad, consulting at all stages of this process – from applying to the Territorial Center of Recruitment (TCR) for removal from military registration to accommodation at the final destination in another country. In particular, Insight and Gender Stream were engaged in this, and the latter, based on the experience of working with TCR in Dnipro, prepared step-by-step instructions for the completion of a procedure there. Also, several organizations support shelters for LGBT+ people or trans people specifically or inclusive for them, which became intermediate places before going abroad for some people.

It can also be mentioned that the issue of lifting the ban on going abroad for men aged 18 to 60 has been repeatedly raised publicly, particularly in many petitions to the president on the relevant website. However, the president in response to one of these petitions and other authorities as well repeatedly made it clear that there are no plans to lift this ban before the end of martial law.

While the flow of people who wanted to leave Ukraine was large in the first months of the great war, later it significantly decreased. According to Insight, the number of requests related to leaving had noticeably decreased since September 2022 and remained at a consistently low level in 2023. Moreover, some of the LGBT+ people who left in the first months later returned to Ukraine.

As for restrictions on going abroad per se, the list of exceptions from them was revised from time to time, but in aspects not related to transwomen and trans people in general. At the very beginning of the full-scale war, international human rights organizations started to prepare proposals to the state to change the relevant legislation, but they were not active in further advocacy of them, so this activity had no practical consequences in the end.

As for military registration, draft law No. 10378 “on the improvement of certain issues of mobilization, military registration, and military service” was introduced at the end of 2023. It proposed many changes – in particular, to remove the category of “limited fitness” at all. At the same time, these changes do not directly affect the part related to transdiagnoses. So it currently looks like, in the case of the implementation of such provision, fitness or unfitness for military service will be still determined by the MMC based on subjective considerations without clear criteria. However, at the time of writing, the Cabinet of Ministers withdrew the draft law for revision, so its final edition may differ.

In general, it can be noted regarding this section that, while the priority of the problem of going abroad has decreased somewhat, the issue of regulating the military registration for trans people itself has come to the fore in the context of mobilization, so it makes sense to focus more on it in the future.

LGBT+ people in the military service

Develop standards for the Armed Forces of Ukraine on inclusion for LGBT+ people, in particular trans people. Ensure the implementation of measures to increase such inclusion on the ground.

At the time of the beginning of the full-scale war, there were no official regulations related to military service that referenced SOGI or related issues. Not to mention such details as, for example, providing trans people in the army with hormonal drugs, which are often of vital necessity. At the same time, right-wing organizations and politicians supported the discourse about the apparent absence of LGBT+ people in the army, and about the contraposition of “LGBT ideology” to patriotism in general. In the absence of other voices, this discourse dominated the public space for a long time.

In 2018, partially in opposition to this, the union “Ukrainian LGBT Military for Equal Rights” was created and registered as a public organization later. It became a platform where LGBT+ military people could talk about their experiences and needs. The union marched in a separate column at the Equality March in Kyiv, it also has its pages and groups in social networks – both open and closed, for the dissemination of information and safe communications of LGBT+ military persons. Its website lists 12 goals of the union, many of which are related to equal rights for partners in same-sex relationships, as well as: “Army regulations, rules and statutes must be made LGBT inclusive.”

At the same time, the army environment in Ukraine was and remains quite homophobic and transphobic. This induces the majority of LGBT+ people in the army to remain closeted – which in turn fuels narratives about their supposed absence there. In the study conducted by the LGBT+ military association in 2019, it was noted that the cruelest manifestations of homophobia, up to physical violence, are experienced by open LGBT+ military persons represented in public space. Another study in 2022 found that the problems related to homophobia are greater, the lower the rank of a military person. It was also subjectively noted that, on average, homosexual women are treated more easily compared to men, but women are more often faced with sexism and sexual harassment.

As for transgender people, if they have not completed the transition and are going to serve, then they are forced to do this under their legal gender. So they delay the start of hormone therapy or suspend it for their expression to correspond to this gender, thus their trans status and true gender identity remain hidden, allowing them to avoid transphobia against themselves. An additional reason for this is the actual unavailability of hormonal drugs in the locations of military units, which can only be compensated by the efforts of LGBT+ organizations and friendly volunteers. On the contrary, trans people in the army, who have already obtained legal gender recognition, try to hide their past to avoid revealing their trans status too. In some cases, when it became known in one way or another, they were subjected to bullying, as well as physical and sexual violence.

The generally low level of awareness in the army regarding sexual orientation and especially trans issues should also be noted. It contributes to the spread of harmful myths and stereotypes, which are becoming the foundation for manifestations of homophobia and transphobia.

In 2023, the LGBT+ military union continued its activities. It was still focused on supporting LGBT+ people in the army including fundraising for the needs of their units, sharing their stories to increase visibility, and advocating for the draft law on registered civil partnerships.

In June, the so-called “Frost Manifesto” had appeared. The pretext for it was the statement of the member of the Azov brigade with the corresponding call sign that he allegedly did not see LGBT+ people at the frontline. The actual manifesto, not agreed with Frost himself, was initiated by another military man, Serhiy Bondar, known for his consistent homophobic position. The latter compiled lists of military units where LGBT+ people seem to be absent, forming them based on anonymous comments without any confirmation. LGBT+ military union responded quickly by compiling a list of more than 50 units where only its members are serving. Having achieved the opposite of the desired effect, the manifesto lost its sense and was no longer distributed beyond purely traditionalist resources.

In August, Sarah Ashton-Cirillo, an openly trans woman, American journalist, and military officer who has covered events in Ukraine since the beginning of the full-scale Russian invasion, was appointed spokesperson for the Territorial Defense Forces. This appointment caused a wide resonance with support in LGBT+-friendly circles and outrage in right-wing conservative ones. To some extent, it can be considered a marker of increased inclusiveness of the army structures for LGBT+ people. However, in less than two months, Ashton-Cirillo was removed from her position for inappropriate statements that were not agreed with the command. In my opinion, it is an open question whether her trans status has become an additional ground to be more critical of her statements.

In general, it can be said that qualitative changes regarding the improvement of the situation of LGBT+ people in the Ukrainian army have not yet occurred, and the recommendation from 2022 is still of the same relevance.

Availability of hormonal drugs for trans people

Ensure the physical and financial availability of hormonal drugs for trans people in all regions of Ukraine, in particular, by including them in the Affordable Medicines program or similar.

The documents of the Ministry of Health that regulate the transition procedure do not touch on the issue of financial availability of any of its components at all. While free medical consultations are theoretically possible (although practically limited by the lack of qualified specialists), when it comes to hormonal drugs, trans people need to buy them at full price. The Affordable Medicines program, effective since 2017, allows people to get some prescription drugs for free or at a discount, but it does not include hormone replacement therapy drugs. At the same time, if a visit to health care professionals can be a one-time or at least not too frequent procedure, then taking hormones must be life-long regular for many trans people. Thus, this is a permanent vital expenditure.

Since the beginning of the full-scale war, the availability of hormonal drugs has only worsened. In the first weeks, even months in some places, many pharmacies stopped working, and huge queues formed in the rest. The ability to get to them was also complicated by the limited operation of transport, roadblocks, and air-raid alarms. At the same time, the information displayed online on the availability of drugs often did not correspond to reality. The situation improved later in most of the controlled territory of Ukraine, except for the frontline zones, where mentioned problems persist to one degree or another (things are even worse in the occupied territories, which will be discussed separately below). At the same time, situations emerged when one or another drug disappeared from the pharmacy network in Ukraine completely. If there is no complete analog of such a drug, it forces either to try to get it from abroad or to change the entire scheme of hormone therapy.

Eventually, the mission to provide trans people with hormones was taken over by LGBT+ and trans organizations. In fact, a certain network was organized, where foreign organizations and volunteers purchase drugs in other European countries, and then send them to Ukraine. This activity, however, exists largely at the expense of voluntary donations, so such a scheme can be considered rather a temporary option.

The availability of hormonal drugs is also affected by the fact that they must formally be supplied by a prescription. In practice, many trans people begin hormone replacement therapy without consulting a doctor, consulting with other people from the trans community instead. This is stipulated, firstly, by the complexity of the official transition procedure, according to which, you must undergo psychiatric observation before starting hormone therapy. Secondly, there is a lack of endocrinologists qualified enough specifically in hormone therapy for trans people – and the situation only worsened during the full-scale war due to the evacuation abroad of some friendly doctors with whom cooperation was established.

The problem is compensated somewhat by the fact that, in practice, pharmacies often do not ask for a prescription when purchasing hormonal drugs, especially in the case of online orders. At the same time, organizations that provide hormones for free usually require some kind of medical confirmation that a person is in transition. This makes sure that the aid would not go to a random person instead of those who really need it but becomes a limitation again for those who have not taken the official transition procedure.

In 2023, there were no initiatives by the Ministry of Health aimed at the availability of hormonal drugs for trans people. Human rights organizations also have not tried to advocate this issue actively. At the same time, NGOs continued to provide medicines to trans people for free. Thus, Insight sent 404 parcels with hormones during the year. Trans*Generation, Gender Stream, and Cohort can be named among other organizations offering this opportunity.

On 1 April, by the order of the Ministry of Health, the electronic format of prescriptions for all prescription drugs came into force. At the same time, it is provided that paper prescriptions will remain valid at least until the end of martial law, and then the medical system of Ukraine should completely switch to electronic ones. While it can generally be seen as a progressive step, it contains a potential danger for trans people. The electronic format being more convenient for automated reporting makes it more likely that the absence of a prescription will not be ignored by pharmacies as before and trans people who do not have one will more likely be refused supplying a drug. At the same time, the prescription is not a diagnosis that a trans person receives once in a lifetime: it must be renewed periodically, requiring regular contact with endocrinologists that are still lacking.

Therefore, it is already necessary to think about how the medical system should be built so that innovations do not turn into a deterioration of access to hormones for trans people. In my opinion, this can be a part of the general process of discussing the changes to realize in the context of the implementation of ICD-11 in Ukraine.

Activities of LGBT+ public organizations

Support the activities of public associations that work with LGBT+ people, in particular, expand their opportunities to receive state funding.

In the situation after the full-scale invasion, most LGBT+ organizations were forced to change their priorities. Mass events, such as the regular annual marches and other public actions, have become impossible at all due to martial law. Advocacy and educational activities, as well as events in general, were also significantly cut down. Instead, aid to the community became first and foremost – primarily humanitarian aid, as well as aid related to evacuation. Psychological and legal aid remained in demand – as for the latter, issues related to going abroad and military registration became particularly topical. With this, the number of situations increased, in which the need for help was urgent. The structure of funding has also changed: voluntary donations from both Ukrainians and foreigners were added to institutional sources to cover needs, which it was impossible to get money from donors for. In this situation, organizations often fundraised for community and military needs in parallel, sometimes combining them, i.e. fundraising for military units where LGBT+ people serve.

Among the specific needs of the community that intensified during the war, it is worth noting the need for temporary shelter for those who left their place of residence. Such general-purpose shelters, supported by the state or various organizations, are usually not inclusive for LGBT+ people. Their policy does not take into account SOGI specifics, so there is a high probability of facing manifestations of homophobia and transphobia. At the same time, hiding SOGI is uncomfortable and not always possible, especially in the cases of couples and trans people whose appearance does not correspond to their legal gender. Finally, a large number of shelters are exclusively for women, therefore they are not accessible to gay and bisexual men, and trans people could also face rejection there. Consequently, several shelters were established by LGBT+ organizations in different cities in Ukraine. Some people stopped there at intermediate points before going abroad, while others stayed until they found permanent housing. Again, such shelters are largely supported by voluntary donations to the organizations.

As for the funding of activities in general, Ukrainian LGBT+ organizations get the main part of it in the form of grants from international funds and organizations, sometimes embassies and governments of certain countries. Such foreign donors do not shape the agenda of organizations directly, nevertheless they have an indirect influence on it. In particular, each donor has its priority topics, which may change over time, and supports projects based on them, as well as a number of its formal requirements for projects. Organizations with permanent staff that need to be paid salaries may find themselves in a situation where they have to include in the projects topics they are not really interested in just to meet the requirements of donors to obtain sufficient funding. In addition, reporting under bureaucratic requirements constantly takes a certain part of the organization’s resources. Also in projects aimed at working with the community, donors usually do not provide funding for the direct provision of services, for humanitarian and financial aid, while a large part of the requests of the community is of this kind.

Since the beginning of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, these contradictions have only intensified. International donors allowed partial redistribution of funding to the humanitarian needs of the community, but this was not enough. Also, project activities involve working according to a certain plan within a predefined time frame, while the situation demands to react “here and now”, as people needed, in particular, urgent help with evacuation from the combat zone, hormones, or just food. The inert bureaucratic structures of large international organizations proved unable to reorganize their work to timely respond to the needs arising on the ground, and in some cases had problems perceiving the “reality of war” adequately as different from the “reality of peace” they were used to. At the same time, the state did not have support programs that would be focused on LGBT+ organizations with their specific activities. The consequence of all this was the situation described above when organizations were forced to limit their activities to priority tasks, relying primarily on their own resources.

The general focus of the activities of public LGBT+ organizations on providing aid to the community remained in 2023. However, other directions have also been restored to a certain extent. After the blackouts related to Russian missile attacks on Ukraine’s energy system ceased in the spring, there were more events for the community again. Advocacy activities have also resumed – primarily in the context of processes related to the draft law No. 9103 on registered partnerships and the implementation of ICD-11.

The ban on mass events remains in force, but in some cases, a creative format of actions was invented to replace them. In particular, on 2 September 2023, the Kharkiv “Women Association Sphere” that organizes KharkivPride, instead of the usual march, held an art intervention with figures placed on the street in the colors of the Ukrainian and LGBT flags to increase the visibility of the LGBT+ community, even in the face of the impossibility of its physical presence.

The feminist resource Gender in Detail launched “Virtual Pride” during Pride month with the same goal, encouraging the active posting of various LGBT+-related materials on social media. In the sense of public actions in general, the emphasis shifted to the participation of LGBT+ Ukrainians in pride parades abroad (more on this in the corresponding section).

The needs related to evacuation have significantly decreased – in particular, the legal service of Insight NGO noted a decrease in the number of requests for going abroad. At the same time, the total number of requests has doubled – in particular, there have been more requests related to issues of military registration and transition. The number of requests for friendly doctors related to the transition also increased proportionally. To generalize, it can be said that the community no longer focused on issues of pure survival, as in the first months of the full-scale war, but was also concerned with issues of the quality of its life – even in the conditions of an ongoing war.

As for requests for temporary residence, according to data from the shelters of Insight and Women’s March, after the highest number of them in the first months of the full-scale war, it gradually decreased until September 2022 (which coincides with the period of decrease in the number of requests for legal aid regarding evacuation).

In 2023, it remains stably low, but generally, the need has not disappeared. Currently the following shelters are known in Ukraine, intended specifically for LGBT+ people or a certain subgroup of them, or inclusive for them:

• shelters jointly supported by Women’s March and Insight organizations in Lviv and Chernivtsi – intended for women and LGBT+people;
• specialized collective center for trans peopleby the Projector organization in Odesa – provides shelter for trans andnon-binary people;

• the shelter of Gender Stream organization in Uzhhorod – intended for LGBTQI+ people;
• shelters of Alliance.Global organization in Kyiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Lviv, and Kharkiv – intended for gays, bisexuals, and other men who have sex with men, transgender and non-binary people, as well as other representatives of LGBTIQ+ communities;
• shelter of the Insha charity organization in Kyiv – intended for LGBTQI+ people from Kherson and Kherson Oblast, and their partners.

There have been no significant changes in the aspect of funding of LGBT+ organizations, however. Although the position of the state has become somewhat more open to LGBT+, it still takes steps toward the community reluctantly and rather under appropriate pressure at the international level. Therefore, there are still no state programs in Ukraine with financial support that would directly address SOGI issues. Thus, the proposal presented in this part does not lose its relevance.

Educational activities on SOGI issues

Conduct educational events for various audiences and professionals, including doctors, police, and military, to increase their awareness of LGBT+ people and their human rights.

In the years before the great war, educational activities on SOGI topics were on the rise in Ukraine. Almost all LGBT+ organizations, as well as some feminist and broader human rights organizations, included them in their general programs of activities.

On the one hand, these are events for a wide audience. They include various publications on LGBT+ topics; campaigns for certain dates, such as Coming Out Day, Pride Month, or Transgender Day of Remembrance; support of thematic websites, pages, and groups in social media; interviews, and participation in media programs, etc. On the other hand, these are events for specific audiences, primarily for certain specialists to raise their awareness as well as establish and expand cooperation with them. In particular:

• Some organizations work with doctors. For example, Insighth as a friendly doctor database, primarily of the specialties involved in the process of transition, and periodically conduct straining for such specialists on working with trans people. The Fulcrum organization also has a Friendly Doctor program related to HIV and STDissues. Cohort NGO also conducts educational events for doctors in the context of the transition.
• Work with the police, generally important due to the prevalence of hate crimes against LGBT+ people, once had especially intensified due to the regular holding of pride marches and other public actions, where it is important to ensure safety for their participants. Gender Stream has an ongoing program of work with the police, which includes anti-discrimination training. Also, Insight and KyivPride engaged in regular interaction with the police with elements of education.
• Many organizations collaborate with friendly psychologists and sometimes conduct educational events for them too. Insight has a training program for psychologists, which is held periodically to expand their friendly network.
• Insight has prepared a course for journalists “How to write about LGBT” to teachthem the correct coverage of this topic, which would contribute to reducing theincitement of hostility and xenophobia.

It should be noted that all such programs are carried out just by the means of public organizations. The state doesn’t contribute to education on the SOGI topics either at the level of a wide audience or at the specialized level. The consequence of this, in particular, is the previously noted lack of qualified health care professionals aware of transition issues. Accordingly, when LGBT+ organizations had to direct most of their resources to help the community after the full-scale Russian invasion, many educational activities were suspended.

In 2023, with the restoration of various activities, educational programs also resumed to some extent. First of all, these are events for those professionals who are constantly in demand by the LGBT+ community. In particular:

• Insight continued the educational course for psychologists, and also held training for doctors and social workers this year;
• The Cohort organization held a series of conferences for health care workers indifferent cities in Ukraine;
• Gender Stream organization continued training for the police, as well as training for businesses on diversity and inclusion.

Among general educational activities, it is also worth mentioning the network resource “Gender in Detail”, which has recently even increased on its website the number of publications dedicated to various aspects of LGBT+ topics in the context of the current state of affairs in Ukraine.

Awareness-raising measures likely include the previously mentioned development in 2023 of criteria for hate speech in the media based on SOGI, in particular, the dictionary of undesirable vocabulary. Potentially, this will have a two-level effect: on the first level, the education of the media community itself regarding the correct terminology and coverage of SOGI topics in general, and on the second level, the education of the audience by these media persons. This is also probably the first example of educational work on LGBT+ issues initiated by the state.

At the same time, such an example is still rare, while the general involvement of the state in SOGI-related education remains low, and there is obvious room for improvement.

LGBT+ people in the occupied territories

In the first days of the full-scale invasion, the Russian army moved rapidly in the South and somewhere in the East of Ukraine, because there were not enough forces to contain it. Thus, the Russians quickly occupied large territories – in particular, almost the entire Kherson region, including Kherson itself. Some LGBT+ organizations, such as Insha, managed to evacuate most of their staff out of there. However, not everyone had the opportunity or could afford to “leave everything and run”, so many LGBT+ people ended up under occupation.

At the end of September 2022, referendums were simulated in the occupied territories. As a consequence, the Russian government announced the joining of the Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhya, and Kherson regions of Ukraine to the Russian Federation. This meant de jure, from that moment on, Russia extended the effect of its legislation to the occupied territories – in particular, the law against the propaganda of “non-traditional sexual relations among minors”, later in 2022 expanded to ban such propaganda including “sex change” among people of any age. De facto, both from the moment when territories were occupied and from the moment of the annexation, the laws in these territories turned into fiction. In the same way, the Russians ignore the conventions that the occupier must follow according to international law. In fact, the occupying power established on the ground is limited in its actions only by the interests of the highest echelons of the Russian authorities, but not by one or other legal norms.

In such a situation, the entire population of the occupied territories found itself at risk of rights violations. With this, LGBT+ people have become a high-risk group – not even because of the above-mentioned law, but because of the aggressive homophobia and transphobia of Russian society in general, fueled over the years by their authorities and the media. In such conditions, LGBT+ people under occupation try to hide their SOGI in every possible way. This means not only not talking about it, but also cleaning the phones from everything related to LGBT+ topics as much as possible, up to the point of deleting not only the content but also the applications, since patrols of the occupiers can demand the phones for inspection at any moment. Tattoos with LGBT+ symbols can also become a problem, and to check tattoos, the occupiers force people to undress right on the streets. The situation is even more difficult for trans people in the process of transition, whose appearance does not correspond with the documents. They refrain from trying to leave the occupied territory, as it is impossible to avoid being checked at checkpoints, and are often afraid to leave their homes at all. In some cases, LGBT+ people pretended to support the occupiers to avoid repression. This, in turn, can become a problem for them after the de-occupation or departure to the controlled territory.

In particular, the following cases of violence by the occupiers against LGBT+ people are known:

• two boys, in whose phones gay groups were found, were taken to the forest, where one was shot in the leg and left there;
• taking lesbians to the forest and abusing them there;
• detention “in the basement” and torture of an LGBT+ activist for two months;
• abuse of a trans girl: her tooth was broken and she was threatened with a gun when they found out about her trans status.

These cases are obviously only the tip of the iceberg, as information about what is happening in the occupied territories is very limited. In fact, most of these cases become known only after the people who survived them have managed to leave and then tell about their experiences.

The mentioned organization Insha tried to maintain contact with LGBT+ people in the occupied territories of Southern Ukraine and help them with their evacuation. According to Marina Usmanova, a representative of this organization, they helped approximately 350 LGBT+ people to get out of there for the period since the beginning of the full-scale war, including the part of the Kherson region that was later liberated. Departure is complicated by the fact that it is usually impossible to go directly to Ukraine through the frontline: you have to go to Russia, and then return to Ukraine through third countries, usually with the help of local volunteers. Such a path is also not guaranteed, since the occupiers decide where exactly to direct buses from the occupied territories, as well as who to let out or not from the Russian territory.

Trans people also face a problem with the availability of hormonal drugs. Moreover, if such problems are partial in the controlled territory of Ukraine and, as already noted, they are largely solved with the help of LGBT+ organizations, then in the occupied territories, hormones are practically unavailable at all. In some cases, it was possible to deliver medicines with the help of volunteers, but these are rather exceptions. In general, LGBT+ activists work together with other volunteers in the delivery of humanitarian aid to the occupied territories, usually without separating one or another group of those to whom it is intended. It is worth noting that even submitting a request for such aid to an LGBT+ organization from there can be dangerous, so after doing that, people usually, again, clean their phones, or even use a separate device for this.

In July 2023, a law was passed in Russia that completely banned the procedure of transition. Subsequently, in late November, the Supreme Court there recognized the “international LGBT movement” as an extremist organization. Both these events had a negative impact on the situation of the LGBT+ community in Russia itself but had little influence on the occupied territories. First of all, because, as already noted, the occupiers are almost not guided by the law in their actions; in addition, the transition is practically unavailable there anyway. At the same time, such changes potentially increase the risk that local collaborators could point to someone as “belonging to the LGBT movement” to hand them over to the occupiers for execution for any reason.

According to Usmanova, by 2023, the majority of LGBT+ people able to do so had already left the occupied territories. Leaving is becoming more difficult over time, and now there are rather individual cases of it. As for aid in general, its delivery, on the one hand, becomes easier as certain paths are organized for it. On the other hand, some paths are being lost with the change of the frontline and new ones have to be sought; also, the occupiers become angrier over time, and that forces volunteers to act more carefully.

In general, only de-occupation, when the territory returns to the Ukrainian legal space, puts the lives of LGBT+ people in it back on track – as has already happened, in particular, with the right-bank part of the Kherson Oblast. Any other measures are either not effective at all – such as political statements at one level or another – or involve high risk. Thus, the main thing that needs to be done to improve the situation of LGBT+ people in these territories as soon as possible is to increase military support of Ukraine.

LGBT+ people from Ukraine abroad

Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation, some LGBT+ people have left Ukraine for other, mostly European countries to secure their lives during the war. In the EU countries, they were able to obtain the status of temporary protection, the registration of which is simpler and imposes fewer restrictions compared to the status of a refugee – in particular, it provides the opportunity to return to Ukraine and then leave for the EU again during its validity.

Under these conditions, the experience of staying abroad is very different for different people, depending on many factors. Gender Stream organization, which conducted research on LGBTQI+ refugees from Ukraine to the EU, names the most vulnerable groups such as trans people who have not undergone legal transition; LGBT+ couples with children; LGBT+ people caring for elderly persons; LGBT+ people with mental health issues; HIV-positive people; people with addictions. The research also identified factors related to the initial conditions of the person himself:

• Involvement in human rights activism. People who worked in LGBT+ organizations or actively interacted with them usually had more information about LGBT+-friendly environments abroad and often had some connections there, so accordingly had more opportunities to consciously choose the best destination for themselves.
• Knowledge of foreign languages. The language barrier appeared as one of the main challenges in integration into the local environment: starting from access to the labor market and ending with joining the local LGBT+ communities. While basic knowledge of English may be sufficient in some places for formal interactions, knowing the language of the host country is needed anyway for full-fledged communication in the local environment.
• Availability of savings. With them, people had more freedom in choosing how to arrange their lives; otherwise, they had to limit themselves to the basic conditions offered to them by the state, providing temporary protection.
• Conditions at the time of departure. People who found themselves in combat zones in the first days were forced to leave quickly, often without enough time to prepare and plan their travel. Instead, those who left later in the absence of immediate danger to their lives had the opportunity to prepare and plan their departure. Also, some got help with evacuation, while others left purely by their own means. Thus, some went to a specific place, knowing what they could expect there, while others traveled at random.

On the other hand, an experience varies by country, and sometimes by location or region, depending on the following factors:

• How friendly the country is in general to LGBT+ people or not. This affects, firstly, the availability of certain services – for example, reproductive ones – for LGBT+ couples. Secondly, attitudes in society and, accordingly, the level of openness that LGBT+ refugees can dare depend on it. In particular, countries directly bordering Ukraine, such as Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia, while being more accessible to go there, also are more homophobic and transphobic. This factor especially played a role for those who did not have the opportunity to choose their place of residence and found themselves together with, in fact, random people.
• Availability and form of legal recognition of same-sex relationships. In Ukraine, such relationships cannot be legalized, so those LGBT+ people who left in couples were legally nobody to each other. For those who left with children, respectively, only one person in the couple had the official status of mother (in most cases) or father. In some European countries, couples could later register their relationship, but, for example, Poland and Slovakia currently offer only very restricted forms of private cohabitation for registration. And even where there are civil partnerships, but no full marriage equality – which is almost all of Eastern Europe – joint or second-parent adoption is not allowed.
• The procedure of transition in the country. Some of the countries of Western Europe have purely administrative procedures for legal gender recognition or allow partial recognition when a person is treated according to their gender identity even without a complete change of identification documents. In other countries, such recognition requires a medical diagnosis and/or certain medical interventions. In such countries, trans people who have not completed the transition procedure in Ukraine are treated according to their legal gender, which does not correspond to their gender identity. In particular, this may affect their placement in gender-separated shelters and hostels, as well as any formal interactions. At the same time, Ukrainian medical documents, such as a certificate of diagnosis or a medical certificate of sex change, are often not recognized in other countries. Thus, people who managed to complete some part of the transition procedure are forced to start it all over again abroad – according to the standards of the respective country. The same applies to prescriptions for hormonal drugs, which must be obtained again at the new place of residence. At the same time – and this does not depend per se on the presence or absence of legal gender recognition – waiting for appointments with doctors can take months. The alternative is paid private doctors in some places, but they are not available everywhere, and not everyone can afford them. Accordingly, trans people could have no access to hormone replacement therapy for months, which in some cases even became an argument for returning to Ukraine.
• Staying in the capital / big city or the countryside. In large cities, more refugees from Ukraine are concentrated – including, usually, LGBT+ people – so it is easier for those settled there to find “their people” and support each other. In addition, capital cities usually have local LGBT+ organizations that can also provide some support and opportunities to engage with the LGBT+ community. Finally, the population of larger cities often treats LGBT+ people with greater acceptance, which is especially important for Eastern European countries with still quite low overall levels of such acceptance. Instead, those LGBT+ refugees who ended up in small towns or rural areas often found themselves more isolated.

It can be added to what has been said that there are no international or national level programs aimed at helping LGBT+ refugees. Such help in varying degrees – first of all, counseling on various aspects of living in a certain country – is sometimes provided by local, and to some extent, by Ukrainian LGBT+ organizations, whose teams are partially abroad too. In some cases, LGBT+ activists from Ukraine were able to unite locally and create an organization specifically aimed to help other LGBT+ Ukrainians abroad – such as Kwitne Queer with its center in Berlin. Some organizations also help with housing – local ones, including Lambda Warszawa in Warsaw, GenderDoc-M within Moldova, and Prague Pride in Prague. Also, the Eurocentralasian Lesbian*Community network organized three shelters in Poland near the border with Ukraine, the Accept association supported a shelter in Bucharest for a long time, and finally, Gender Stream established a residence for restart and relax in Bratislava.

In addition, it is worth mentioning that LGBT+ Ukrainians abroad actively participated in pride marches, using them as an additional possibility to remind them about the need to support Ukraine in the war. In the conditions when it is impossible to conduct pride marches in Ukraine itself, some activists with permission to travel abroad purposefully went there for pride parades. And KyivPride organized marches of Ukrainian columns as part of pride parades in European cities instead of the traditional Equality March in Kyiv.

When leaving Ukraine, LGBT+ people – except for the minority of those who instantly decided that they would not return – had no idea how long they would be leaving for. Many did not have long-term plans and, accordingly, did not try to integrate into the local society – they avoided learning the language, looking for a job, etc. Some people returned to Ukraine within a few months, when the situation in the controlled territory had relatively stabilized, while they either could not adapt to life in another country or realized that they did not want to stay there for a long time. Instead, others somehow adapted to long-term living abroad. In 2023, the flow of people both from Ukraine and to Ukraine has significantly decreased, that is, the majority has decided on a life strategy according to their place of residence.

In the above-mentioned research on LGBT+ refugees abroad, two-thirds of respondents stated that they do not plan to return to Ukraine even after the war. Due to the small sample, this number cannot be considered representative, but it is worth noting the mentioned reasons for such a decision:

• fears for the safety of children in the post-war country;
• reluctance to go through the stress related to adaptation to changing conditions again;
• the prospect of strengthening of right-wing radical nationalist groups and homophobic and transphobic violence;
• fears about economic instability;
• fears of discrimination on the grounds of SOGI;
• desire to gain new life experience.

Among the reasons not mentioned here is the fact that some people physically have nowhere to return to – for example, their home was destroyed, and they would have to start life in Ukraine from scratch, just like in another country. At the same time, several research participants said that they liked living in Ukraine, and now, being in another country, they can appreciate it even more than before, so they surely want to return.

It should be noted that the status of temporary protection granted by the EU, as at the time of writing, is to be extended until March 2025. Currently, it is not known whether the war will be still ongoing at that time, and whether the European Commission and/or individual EU states will continue to extend this status – the same or somewhat modified. So its completion may potentially push part of people to return to Ukraine, and another part to apply for refugee status or another, depending on the available opportunities in the host country.

As for the activism of LGBT+ Ukrainians abroad, in 2023, KyivPride organized the Equality March based on the pride march in Liverpool, where the Eurovision Song Contest was just held. Its slogan was “The war is not over” to remind people that Ukraine is still fighting for the right to freedom and needs support. Ukrainians also participated in other pride parades abroad. At the same time, opinions about such activities in the LGBT+ community were divided. In particular, given that pride in Western countries has a more celebratory nature, against the background of which messages about the war are lost, and the difference between LGBT+ people abroad and those who stay in Ukraine and do not have the opportunity to participate in such events also deepens.

To summarize in general, the situation later will largely depend on how things in Ukraine will go on: both the course of military operations and the reconstruction, economic development, and reformation of the country, including legislation for equal rights for LGBT+ people. Positive changes in these aspects will motivate more people to return, while negative changes or simply a lack of progress will push more LGBT+ Ukrainians to link their future lives with other countries.

Social and media trends on LGBT+

Ukrainian society in general is moderately homophobic and transphobic. In my opinion, there has been a trend towards polarization in recent years, with opponents of LGBT+ on one pole (churches, right-wing radical groups, conservative politicians), supporters on the other pole (LGBT+ people themselves, human rights organizations, friendly media, and politicians), and the relatively neutral majority without a clear position in between. Thus, the task of social groups with an active position has become to win over the most of this majority.

At the same time, the attitude towards LGBT+ topics in the media space has become more tolerant over the years. This is manifested, in particular, in the use of more correct terminology: “homosexuality” instead of “homosexualism”, less use of incorrect pronouns and names of trans people, etc. The content of publications that mention LGBT+ people and events where they appear became more neutral on average, and publishers gave voice to LGBT+ people themselves more often. The number of LGBT+-friendly journalists and media platforms that periodically publish informational and educational materials on relevant topics has increased.

Since the beginning of the full-scale war, the activity of right-wing radical organizations has significantly decreased. This could be explained, on the one hand, by their significant focus on the public activities of the LGBT+ movement, primarily in the form of a reaction to large public events, such as pride marches, which became impossible under martial law. On the other hand, also their change of priorities – directing their efforts to counter Russian aggression; and in some cases by suspended funding or even termination of some of their associations in the changed circumstances. Generally in these circumstances, public manifestations of homophobia and transphobia have mostly been reduced to rhetoric on the Internet and in the media in the context of LGBT+-related events: pride month, when this topic is raised in various aspects, as well as relevant news from other countries and legislative proposals, relating to LGBT+ people.

The indicated trends correlate with the data of social surveys. Thus, according to the data of the KIIS study commissioned by the Nash Svit Center, the number of those who had a negative attitude towards LGBT+ people decreased from 60.4% in 2016 to 38.2% in 2022, and the number of those who had a positive attitude increased from 3.3% to 12.8%. The neutral attitude also increased: from 30.7% to 44.8%.

The trends described above persisted in 2023 as well. Pride Month, LGBT+ people in the army, and, especially, the draft law on registered civil partnerships were the main newsmakers that drove public discussions around LGBT+ issues. Notable examples of both friendly and unfriendly to LGBT+ people manifestations in public spaces are mentioned below.

Friendly:

• During Pride month, many companies on their initiative, that is, not at the request of the activist community, painted their logos in rainbow colors, and some additionally demonstrated their support for LGBT+ people. Among them are all three major mobile operators (Kyivstar, Vodafone, Lifecell), Internet provider Lanet, Ukrposhta postal service, Bimba and Vydavnytsto publishing houses, Kyiv 24 TV channel, Ukrinform agency, Comfy store chain and others. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy also joined this spontaneous campaign.
• Singer Olya Polyakova led the Ukrainian pride column in London, appearing in a costume of a fighter for justice, human rights, and freedom, noting: “War does not choose your gender, sexual orientation or what color your eyes are.” Although it was positioned as celebrity support for theLGBT+ community, the community itself perceived such a gesture ambiguously in the sense that it would be more appropriate to see an LGBT+ person at the head of the column.
• The head of Ukrzaliznytsia railway company on passenger communications, announcing women’s compartments in May, mentioned transwomen among those to whom they should be available. However, this seems more of just a media statement than a real willingness to take into account the peculiarities of transwomen – in particular, those who have not obtained legal gender recognition yet. The ticketing system currently only informs that certain seats belong to women’s compartments, so in the case when a person has a male legal gender, admission to them may depend on the decisionof the conductor. It is currently unknown whether Ukrzaliznytsia has special instructions for such cases.

• According to the analysis of the media space conducted by mediaanalyst Olga Bilousenko in the summer of 2023, the majority of publications onthe topic of draft law No. 9103 “On the Institute of RegisteredPartnerships” were neutral or positive. This trend also spread to regionalonline media. In the analyst’s opinion, the media’s interest in this topic aswell as efforts to understand and analyze it can also be considered positive.

Unfriendly:

• In March, UCCRO appealed to the Verkhovna Rada to reject the draft law on registered partnerships, calling it “an attack on the institution of marriage and family.” All major Ukrainian churches made similar statements soon. Moreover, in July, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine approved the declaration “On a negative attitude to the sin of sodomy (homosexualism) and its propaganda in society, to gender ideology and so-called same-sex marriages (same-sex cohabitations)”, the essence of which directly follows from the title. Until then, the OCU’s statements regarding LGBT+ topics, although not friendly, were usually less sharp, so it was obviously the legislative initiative on civil partnerships that pushed them to a tougher position.
• Some local councils mostly in Western Ukraine, in particular the Lviv Regional Council, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Lutsk City Councils appealed to the Verkhovna Rada not to adopt the draft law on civil partnerships, which allegedly poses a “threat to the national security of Ukraine and the protection of its national interests”. It could be noted that a few years ago, a wave of similar appeals on the local level, coordinated by churches, contributed to the fact that the item on civil partnerships was actually dropped from the agenda of the Action Plan for the implementation of the National Human Rights Strategy for 2015–2020. Now, however, such appeals have not become so massive, which points once more to a general change in public attitudes towards LGBT+.
• In June, against the background of Pride month, the Soft.ua company published a vacancy, noting among the requirements that the candidate should “not belong to the LGBTcommunity.” Soon, after numerous negative reactions in the network, the requirement was removed. Instead, the company published a position post on social networks, noting that it stands for Ukrainian traditions and against LGBT people, whom itequated with “pervirts” and Russian occupiers. When that post was also blocked, the company said it faced an “organized LGBT attack” and that its position remains unchanged despite removing the requirement.
• In June, the right-wing conservative military began to spread the thesis about the alleged absence ofLGBT+ people in the army. This situation is discussed in more detail above in the section on LGBT+ people in military service.
• Also in June, when the Comfy chain of stores supported the LGBT+ community with a rainbow logo, the Prava Molod (“Right Youth”) organization conducted actions near its stores in Lviv and several other cities. They distributed leaflets, calling Comfy a “club for pedophiles.” The actions, however, did not have the effect desired by their organizers: the marketing director of Comfy noted that both online sales and the number of followers of the store on social networks only increased.

These examples generally confirm the trends described above, firstly, regarding the polarization of positions around the LGBT+ issues, and secondly, that the general public opinion is becoming more favorable to LGBT+ people.

Public opinion polls conducted in 2023 also show the latter. Thus, another KIIS survey commissioned by the LGBT Human Rights NASH SVIT Center in May revealed a further decrease in negative attitudes toward LGBT+ people (33.9%) and an increase in positive attitudes (15.5%). In addition, 67.3% believe that LGBT+ people should have equal rights with other citizens (25.9% against this), and 28.0% support the right of LGBT+ people to register partnerships without joint adoption of children (38.9% against). In the latter, the number of opponents still prevails, but there are also 25.8% of people with an indifferent attitude, and if the trend remains, they will add more to the number of supporters.

A survey by the Rating Group conducted in March shows worse results at first sight: 9% positive attitude towards LGBT+ people against 41% negative. However, only 28% of them are clearly negative, while there are also 48% of respondents with a neutral attitude. So there is also a great potential for changing attitudes to a more positive side if the changes continue in the same way. Finally, a survey by UNICEF’s digital platform U-Report, conducted in November on the platform’s chatbot, found that among young people aged 14–34, 80% of women and 52% of men support equal rights for heterosexual and homosexual people. And 56% of respondents support the introduction of same-sex partnerships with the possibility of adopting children. Although this survey is not fully representative, it can still be noted that it is the youth who demonstrate a higher level of acceptance of LGBT+ people. The above-mentioned KIIS survey shows a similar trend in data disaggregated by age.

Summary

After summarizing all the considered dynamics, on the one hand, it can be seen that there were positive changes during 2023 in almost all areas. On the other hand, these changes yet led to results that would satisfy the proposals for improving the protection and enforcement of the rights of LGBT+ people presented in 2022 in any of those areas. Therefore, state institutions need to continue moving in the directions where certain steps have already been taken (these are, first of all, the consideration and adoption of the draft law No. 9103 on registered partnerships, the draft law No. 5488 on strengthening liability for discrimination, hate crimes and hate speech on the grounds of SOGI, as well as the implementation of the ICD-11), and to become more active in others with no or minimal movement on their side yet.

In addition to this, the further dynamics of changes in Ukraine – not only in the specified areas but also in a broader context – will influence the situation of Ukrainian LGBT+ people both directly and indirectly. Thus, the liberation of the territories currently occupied by the Russian Federation will contribute to the fact that LGBT+ people there will return to the legal framework of Ukraine and find themselves in greater security. And vice versa: new territorial losses will lead to a worsening of the situation of LGBT+ people in the respective territories and may prompt a new wave of evacuation from Ukraine in general. And if both the course of events at the frontline and the general socio-political situation in Ukraine develop positively, then more LGBT+ people who are currently abroad will return to Ukraine.

Also, European integration processes, which should move to the level of preparation for joining the EU in 2024, keep open a window of opportunity that will contribute to the promotion of initiatives to improve equal rights for LGBT+ people. However, civil activists should not expect that the state authorities would support them just taking into account the recommendations from the EU. But, attracting allies from the friendly part of society, they should also use the opportunities and increase the pressure on the authorities, demanding faster implementation of changes that will bring equality closer.